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As we know, there is a controversy about the decision making under risk between 
economists and psychologists. We discuss to build a unified theory of risky 
choice, which would explain both of compensatory and non-compensatory 
theories. For risky choice, according to cognition ability, we argue that people 
could not build a continuous and accurate subjective probability world, but 
several order concepts, such as small, middle and large probability. People make 
decisions based on information, experience, imagination and other things. All of 
these things are so huge that people have to prepare some strategies. That is, 
people have different strategies when facing to different situations. The 
distributions of these things have different decision structures. More precisely, 
decision making is a process of simplifying the decision structure. However, the 
process of decision structure simplifying is not stuck in a rut, but through 
different path when facing problems repeatedly. It is why preference reversal 
always happens when making decisions. The most efficient way to simplify the 
decision structure is calculating expected value or making decision based on one 
or two dimensions. We also argue that the deliberation time at least has four parts, 
which are consist of substitution time, τ’’ (G) dτ time, τ’ (G) dτ time and 
calculation time. Decision structure also can simply explain the phenomenon of 
paradoxes and anomalies. JEL Codes: C10, D03, D81 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is the origin of risk? It is possible to construct very special cases. My 
nephew, little Rugmann, is 6 months old. One day he got a mystery box from 
Schrödinger. His greatest pleasure is opening this box before going to sleep. Imagine 
little Rugmann play with the Schrödinger’s cat every night. However, the morning sun 
never lasts a day. Several days later, he opens the box and finds a dead cat. At this 
time, little Rugmann is aware of risk, a risky box, a risky cat. He is so worried that he 
has not enough courage to open this box every night. In other words, the meaning of 
origin of risk can be illustrated by an idiom that they who know nothing fear nothing. 
What is the human decision making? Sometimes we have to acknowledge that 
the experimental studies are different from the real life decisions. Decision strategy is 
not stuck in a rut, but based on the things, in the real life, and experiment materials, in 
the laboratory. So we could not build a theory without discussing them. It is no doubt 
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that, according to our cognition ability, we could not build a continuous and accurate 
subjective probability world. That is, we can only establish several intervals of 
probability perception. 
As we know, there is a controversy about the decision making under risk 
between economists and psychologists. For the most of economists, risky choice is 
based on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. Alternatively, the most of 
psychologists think that decision making is a trading off process between different 
dimensions, such as risk dimension, value dimension. Necessarily, however, we 
strictly believe that we have to build a unified theory of risky choice, which would 
explain both of compensatory and non-compensatory theories. Note that, since gain 
and loss are two different parts of the decision under risk. For simplicity, we will just 
discuss the gain of risky choice and neglect the influence of non-strategy, such as 
emotion, intelligence, gender and others. 
From a metaphysical point of view, first of all, we will discuss origin of risk, 
namely that the perception of probability or risk. It is no doubt that risk and 
probability are abstract concepts, which were acquired subsequently. With increasing 
age, little Rugmann establishes two constant concepts of probability, and the first 
cognition of risky or probability is 0, which means gain nothing. Then, he is promptly 
recognized the meaning of 1, that is gain everything. After that, Rugmann at least 
develops three concepts, near to zero a, near to one c, between zero to one b. All of 
five concepts constitute the first rudiment of probability system, which is called 
probability set. Moreover, with development of experience, new probability, p = 0.1, 
will be substituted for an appropriate element, near to zero a, of the probability set.  
II. DECISION STRUCTURE 
Decision making under risk is a process of simplifying the decision structure, 
which is distribution of probabilities and rewards in the decision matrix. Let us give a 
new mathematical expression of decision making, which is called decision matrix G. 
More precisely, a relative position relationship of elements can be defined as a 
decision matrix. The top left corner of decision matrix shows the smallest element, 
and the bottom left corner shows the largest element. For instance, G1 was showed as 
follow, 
G1 = (
𝑖 𝑗
1 𝑘
), i< j< k<1.    (1) 
We first introduce some basic definitions for the sake of completeness. 
Definition 1. Let us define the operation of decision matrix, which is the 
Hadamard product of G1 and G2, denoted by G1 ° G2, the decision matrix as follows. 
G = G1 ° G2 = (
𝑖 𝑗
𝑙 𝑘
) ° (
𝑖′ 𝑗′
𝑙′ 𝑗′
)  
= (
𝑖𝑖′ 𝑗𝑗′
𝑙𝑙′ 𝑘𝑘′
)  0 < 𝑎𝑎′< 𝑏𝑏′< 𝑐𝑐′< 𝑙𝑙′.  (2) 
Definition 2. Let Sp be the set of all probabilities. Now define the set of all 
acquired probabilities. 
Gp = {a ∈ Sp | a was acquired subsequently } 
Definition 3. The set of all substitution functions from Sp to Gp is denoted by {f: 
Sp → Gp}. 
Sp (0) → Gp (0);  
 Sp (P1, P2…Pk-1) → Gp (𝑎); 
Sp (Pk, Pk+1…Pm-1) → Gp (𝑏); 
Sp (Pm, Pm+1…Pn) → Gp (𝑐);  
Sp (1) → Gp (1) 
Thus, 
Gp = {0, a, b, c, 1} 
For simplicity, the decision matrix of probability Gp as follows, 
Gp = (
𝑎 𝑏
1 𝑐
), a< b< c<1.    (3) 
In the same way, we also give the expression of rewards, money, in the risky 
choice. The first rudiment of value system has two constant elements: zero and 
infinity, three concepts: a’ = small, b' = mean, c' = large. 
Definition 4. Let SV be a set of rewards, SV∈(0,∞). Gv= {0, a’, b', c', ∞} is a 
subset of SV. Decision matrix of value as follow, 
GV = (
𝑎′ 𝑏′
∞ 𝑐′
), a’< b' < c' < ∞.    (4) 
Assumptions 1. The substitution does not stop until human can compare a 
superiority option, which must be substituted for a superiority position in the decision 
matrix.  
Assumptions 2. A new probability or value will be substituted for appropriate 
element in the decision matrix.  
It is assumed that there are two options: A (Pi, Vi) vs. B (Pj, Vj), Pi, Pj∈Sp, Vi, 
Vj∈Sv. For instance,  
1) Ga = Gp ° Gv = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑗′
1 1
) , the option B always has the superiority 
position in the decision matrix. This situation was called Zero Order 
Substitution, τ (G).  
2) Gb = Gp ° Gv = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗′
1 1
) , the option B not always has the superiority 
position in the decision matrix. This situation was called First Order 
Substitution, τ’ (G).  
3) Gc = Gp ° Gv = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′
1 1
) , we don’t know, options crossing, which 
option has the superiority position in the decision matrix. This situation was 
called Second Order Substitution, τ’’ (G).  
According to Assumptions 1 and Gc, we can deduce that Second Order 
Substitution will simplify to First Order Substitution during decision making process, 
which was called order reduction, denoted by dτ. 
Thus, 
4) Gd = τ’’ (Gc) dτ = (
𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′
1 1
) , this situation was called risk seeking. 
5) Ge = τ’’ (Gc) dτ = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖′
1 1
) , this situation was called risk aversion. 
6) Gd = τ’’ (Gc) dτ = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 1
) , this situation was called value seeking. 
7) Ge = τ’’ (Gc) dτ = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑖′𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑗
1 1
) , this situation was called value aversion. 
What is decision structure? Imagine that there are two cups. Which one do you 
prefer? The cups have a number of attributes such as color, size and weight. The 
distribution of attribute is called decision structure. If all attribute of cup A is better 
than cup B, decision structure theory predicts that people will choose cup A. This 
structure is called zero order substitution. That is, we need not substitution anymore. 
So, what is substitution? If I tell you the win probability of gamble is 0.1, you will 
think, wow, how small this probability is. Actually, 0.1 is number, and small 
probability is concept. The first step, 0.1 is substituted for small probability. This is a 
substitution. If some attributes are closely, this structure is called first order 
substitution. Namely that people have to substitute this structure for zero order or 
make decision based on one or two attributes. If all attributes are cross, this structure 
is called second order substitution. In this structure, people have to substitute twice or 
more, or calculate expected value. In a word, decision making is a process of 
simplifying the decision structure, from complex to easy or familiar. Next step, there 
are 3 main structures. 
 (i). Zero Order Substitution, τ (G): 
Gp = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗
1 1
)    (5) 
Gp = (
𝑎𝑖 1
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (6) 
Gp = (
1 𝑏𝑖
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (7) 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑖’ 𝑏𝑗 ’
1 1
)    (8) 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑖’ 1
1  𝑐𝑗 ’
)    (9) 
Gv = (
1 𝑏𝑖’
1 𝑐𝑗’
)    (10) 
(5) ° (8) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (11) 
In this case, obviously, we can deduce that option B (Pj, Vj) is always appearing 
at the superiority position of decision matrix. Thus, we do not want to deeply discuss 
this situation. 
(ii). First Oder Substitution, τ’ (G): 
Section 1   
Gp = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 1
1 1
)    (12) 
Gp = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗
1 1
)    (13) 
Gp = (
1 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗
)    (14) 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑖’ 𝑏𝑗 ’
1 1
)    (15) 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑖’ 1
1 𝑐𝑗 ’
)    (16) 
Gv = (
1 𝑏𝑖’
1  𝑐𝑗 ’
)    (17) 
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G. 
(12) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (18) 
(12) ° (16) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖′ 1
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (19) 
(12) ° (17) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (20) 
(13) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (21) 
(13) ° (16) = (
𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (22) 
(13) ° (17) = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (23) 
 (14) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗
)    (24) 
(14) ° (16) = (
𝑎𝑖′ 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑗′
)    (25) 
(14) ° (17) = (
1 𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑗′
)    (26) 
    In this section, the probability matrix has same position substitution. However, 
the value matrix has different size relationship substitution.  
Section 2 
Gp = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗
1 1
)    (27) 
Gp = (
𝑎𝑖 1
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (28) 
Gp = (
1 𝑏𝑖
1  𝑐𝑗
)    (29) 
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G. 
(27) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′𝑎𝑖′ 𝑏𝑗
1 1
)    (30) 
(27) ° (16) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (31) 
(27) ° (17) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (32) 
(28) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑖′𝑎𝑗′ 1
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (33) 
(28) ° (16) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (34) 
(28) ° (17) = (
𝑎𝑖 1
1 𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (35) 
 (29) ° (15) = (
𝑎𝑖’𝑎𝑗 ’ 𝑏𝑖
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (36) 
(29) ° (16) = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑖 ’𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (37) 
(29) ° (17) = (
1 𝑏𝑖
1 𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖’𝑐𝑗′
)    (38) 
In this structure, the most of non-compensatory theories have better fit. Namely, 
these theories believe that the decision making is trading off between two dimensions, 
which are probability dimension and reward dimension. Let us considered (18) that 
we will neglect the difference of probability dimension, and make decision depending 
on the size difference between Vi and Vj, τ (G) = τ’ (G18) dτ. In this case, these are the 
decision structures expression of Equate-to-differentiate theory (Li, 2004). 
(iii). Second Order Substitution, τ’’ (G): 
Section 1. Options Paralleling 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑖’𝑎𝑗’ 1
1 1
)    (39) 
Gv = (
1 𝑏𝑖’𝑏𝑗 ’
1 1
)    (40) 
Gv = (
1 1
1  𝑐𝑖’𝑐𝑗’
)    (41) 
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G. 
(12) ° (39) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑖′𝑎𝑗′ 1
1 1
)    (42) 
(12) ° (40) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (43) 
(12) ° (41) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 1
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (44) 
(13) ° (39) = (
𝑎𝑖′𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗
1 1
)    (45) 
(13) ° (40) = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 1
)    (46) 
(13) ° (41) = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (47) 
(14) ° (39) = (
𝑎𝑖′𝑎𝑗′ 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗
)    (48) 
(14) ° (40) = (
1 𝑏𝑖′𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗
)    (49) 
(14) ° (41) = (
1 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (50) 
In this case, the probability matrix and value matrix have same position 
substitution. Thus, we cannot compare the A (Pi, Vi) and B (Pj, Vj) immediately. 
From assumptions 1, therefore, we have to substitute probability or value matrix 
further, during decision making. Let us considered (42) that if Vj > Vi, 𝑎𝑗′ will be 
substituted for 𝑏𝑗′. Then, (42) can be described as (18), τ (G18) =τ’ (G42) dτ. In the 
same way, all of structure τ’’ (G) can be deduced to structure τ’ (G). 
Section 2. Options Crossing 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑗’ 𝑏𝑖’
1 1
)    (51) 
Gv = (
𝑎𝑗’ 1
1  𝑐𝑖’
)    (52) 
Gv = (
1 𝑏𝑗 ’
1 𝑐𝑖’
)    (53) 
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G. 
(5) ° (51) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′
1 1
)    (54) 
(5) ° (52) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑗
1 𝑐𝑖′
)    (55) 
(5) ° (53) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑖′
)    (56) 
(6) ° (51) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (57) 
(6) ° (52) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 1
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗
)    (58) 
 (6) ° (53) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′
)    (59) 
(7) ° (51) = (
𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑗
)    (60) 
 (7) ° (52) = (
𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑖
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗
)    (61) 
(7) ° (53) = (
1 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗′
1 𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′
)    (62) 
Unfortunately, in this case, we could not immediately compare the A (Pi, Vi) and 
B (Pj, Vj). In this structure, there are two sub-structures, such as options crossing, 
options paralleling. Actually, this structure leads to most of non-compensatory 
theories instability.  
We have to acknowledge that the most efficient way to reduce the order of 
decision structure is calculating expected value. Sometimes, we make decision based 
on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. That is, we will calculate EVi= 
Pi×Vi and EVj= Pj×Vj. After that, we will compare EVi with EVj, and then choose the 
bigger one. However, the calculate process, which is expending vast amounts of 
energy. It is a dilemma problem if EVi = EVj or we are not able to compare 
relationship between EVi and EVj immediately. More precisely, decision making is an 
order reduction process, which is simplifying the decision structure. Thus, the 
deliberation time (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) at least has four parts, which are 
consist of substitution time t0, τ’’ (G) dτ time t1, τ’ (G) dτ time t2 and calculation time 
tcal.  
In addition, preference reversal is an unexplained phenomenon. The preference 
reversal often happens on the second order substitution, options crossing or 
paralleling. At this time, we have to reduce the order of decision structure. For 
instance, A (Pi, Vi) and B (Pj, Vj), 
τ’’ (G54) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗′ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖′
1 1
)    (63) 
d𝜏
⇒ 
{
 
 
 
 
𝝉’(𝐺18) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑗’ 𝑏𝑖’
1 1
)
𝝉’(𝐺21) = (
𝑎𝑗’ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖’
1 1
)
𝝉’(𝐺30) = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗’𝑎𝑖’ 𝑏𝑗
1 1
)
𝝉’(𝐺31) = (
𝑎𝑖 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑖’𝑏𝑗’
1 1
)
    (64) 
d𝜏
⇒ {
𝝉(𝐺)  =  (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑖 ’ 𝑏𝑗𝑏𝑗 ’
1 1
)  →  B >  A
𝝉(𝐺)  =  (
𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑗’ 𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑖 ’
1 1
) →  A >  B
    (65) 
 Let us consider second order substitution (63) that the decision structure 
changing from second order to zero order. The different results were deduced from 
different paths. We are very certainly that the order reduction is an implicit process. 
Namely, we are not really sure which path will occur during decision making process. 
It is why preference reversal always happens when making decisions. 
From the above assumption, we do not want to discuss merits or drawbacks nor 
and just want to explain most of current theory. We have now deduced the requisite 
laws of the decision structure, and we proceed to show application to compensatory 
theories of risky choice  
III. STRUCTURE DECISION OF COMPENSATORY 
Mainstream theories of decision making under risk hold that risky choices are 
based on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. Furthermore, let us rethink 
these compensatory theories which reveal the relationship between options, Sp and Sv, 
and substitution elements, Gp and Gv. 
 According to structure of decision matrix, there are two options:  
A (Pi, Vi) vs. B (Pj, Vj) 
Let us assume that  
a = k1Pi = k1’Pj    (66) 
b = k2Pi = k2’Pj     (67) 
c = k3Pi = k3’Pj     (68) 
a ' = m1Vi = m1’Vj    (69) 
b’ = m2Vi = m2’Vj    (70) 
c’ = m3Vi = m3’Vj    (71) 
As we know, a new one will be substituted for an appropriate element of the 
decision matrix, and from (66) - (71), it immediately follows 
aa’ = k1m1Pia Via = k1’m1’PjaVja    (72) 
bb’ = k2m2PibVib = k2’m2’PjbVjb    (73) 
cc’ = k3m3PicVic = k3’m3’PjcVjc    (74) 
Corollary 1 
Let us discuss particular types of above equations: 
if k = k’ = m = m’ = 1,  
aa’ =PiaVia = PjaVja     
bb’ = PibVib = PjbVjb    
cc’ = PicVic = PjcVjc     
In this case, it is the decision structures expression of the EV. 
Corollary 2 
if k = k’ = 1 and m & m’ ≠ 1,  
aa’ = m1PiaVia = m1’PjaVja     
bb’ = m2PibVib = m2’PjbVjb     
cc’ = m3PicVic = m3’PjcVjc    
In this case, it is the decision structures expression of the Expected Utility (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). 
Corollary 3 
if k & k’ ≠ 1 and m & m’ ≠ 1,  
aa’ = k1m1PiaVia = k1’m1’PjaVja     
bb’ = k2m2PibVib = k2’m2’PjbVjb     
cc’ = k3m3PicVic = k3’m3’PjcVjc     
In this case, it is the decision structures expression of the Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
IV. APPLICATION TO MORE DECISION PHENOMENA 
 IV. A. Allais Paradox 
Firstly, the Allais paradox consists of two pairs of choices, each pair having two 
alternative prospects (Allais, 1953). The first pair of Allais paradox is, A (Pi = 1, Vi = 
1 000 000) vs. B (Pj1 = .1, Vj1 = 5 000 000; Pj2 = .89, Vj2 = 1 000 000; Pj3 = .01, Vj3 
= 0). 
Let us consider the structure of Allais paradox, 
Pi → 1, Vi → 𝑐𝑖′; 
Pj1 → 𝑎𝑗, Vj1 → 𝑐𝑗′; 
Pj2 → 𝑏𝑗, Vj2 → 𝑐𝑗′; 
Pj3 → 𝑎𝑗, Vj3 → 0. 
Thus, 
GI = (
𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑗 𝑏𝑗
1𝑖 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′𝑐𝑗′
)    (75) 
In this case, we can deduce, the option A always has superiority position in the 
decision matrix, that the option A > B.  
The second pair of choice is, C (Pi1 = .11, Vi1 = 1 000 000; Pi2 = .89, Vi2 = 0) vs. 
D (Pj1 = .1, Vj1 = 5 000 000; Pj2 = .9, Vj2 = 0). 
Where, 
Pi1 → 𝑎𝑖, Vi1 → 𝑐𝑖′; 
Pi2 → 𝑐𝑖, Vi2 → 0; 
Pj1 → 𝑎𝑗, Vj1 → 𝑐𝑗′; 
Pj2 → 𝑐𝑗, Vj2 → 0; 
Thus, 
GII = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
)    (76) 
In this case, the (76) also can be described as (44). Namely, the (76) is a variation 
structure of the two order substitution. As mentioned above, all of two order 
substitution structures can be reduced to one order substitution structures.   
GII = (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 1
1 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
) 
d𝜏
⇒ (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 1
1 𝑐𝑖′𝑐𝑗′
) 
d𝜏
⇒ (
𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗 𝑏𝑖′
1 𝑐𝑗′
)    (77) 
Thus, we can deduce that option C < D. 
IV. B. The Performance of π Function 
As we know, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was discussed the weighting 
function π, which relates decision weights to stated probabilities. They believe that 
large and intermediate probabilities are underweighted while small probabilities are 
overweighted. 
Let us assume that the elements of probability matrix consist of {0, a = .3, b = .5, 
c = .7, 1}. In addition, Pi is a small probability, from 0 to 0.35; Pj is an intermediate 
probability, from .35 to .7; Pk is a large probability, from .7 to 1.  
So, let us discuss the substitution of probability matrix. 
Where, 
Gp = (
𝑎 𝑏
1 𝑐
), a< b< c<1. 
Pi → 𝑎 =  .3; 
Pj → 𝑏 =  .5; 
Pk → 𝑐 =  .7. 
Thus,  
(a) If Pi < 𝑎, the small probabilities are overweighted.  
(b) If Pj < 𝑏, the intermediate probabilities are overweighted.  
(c) If Pj > 𝑏, the intermediate probabilities are underweighted.  
(d) If Pk > 𝑐, the large probabilities are underweighted. 
From the above assumption, we can deduce why the weighting function π has 
these performance. However, it is known that the value range is larger than 
probability range in experiments. Obviously, the substitutive range is, 𝑎′< 𝑏′< 𝑐′. 
That is, we can also deduce, from value matrix, that the value function is generally 
concave for gain. In addition, the decision structure can simply explain the 
phenomenon of subadditive, subcertainty and subproportionality.      
IV. C. Ellsberg Paradox 
Ellsberg (1961) propose that suppose you have an urn containing 30 red balls 
and 60 other balls that are either black or yellow. The balls are well mixed so that 
each ball is as likely to be drawn as any other.  
Gamble A: You receive $100 if you draw a red ball; 
Gamble B: You receive $100 if you draw a black ball; 
Gamble C: You receive $100 if you draw a red or yellow ball; 
Gamble D: You receive $100 if you draw a black or yellow ball. 
Let us consider the structure of Ellsberg paradox, 
Gamble A:  PA = 
1
3
, VA = 100 
Gamble B:  PB = p, VB = 100, PB∈(0, 
2
3
) 
Gamble C:  PC = q, VC = 100, PC∈(
1
3
, 1) 
Gamble D:  PD = 
2
3
, VD = 100 
Then, let us consider the substitution of decision matrix. 
PA = 
1
3
 → 𝑎𝐴 
PB → 𝑎𝐵 or 𝑏𝐵 , PB∈(0, 
2
3
) 
PC → 𝑏𝐶 or 𝑐𝐶  , PC∈(
1
3
, 1) 
PD = 
2
3
 → 𝑏𝐷 
V → b′ 
Thus, 
GAB = (
 𝑎𝐴𝑎𝐵 𝑏𝐴′𝑏𝐵′
1 1
)    (78) 
GAB’ = (
 𝑎𝐴 𝑏𝐵𝑏𝐴′𝑏𝐵′
1 1
)    (79) 
GCD = (
 1 𝑏𝐶𝑏𝐷𝑏𝐶′𝑏𝐷′
1 1
)    (80) 
GCD’ =  (
 1 𝑏𝐷𝑏𝐶′𝑏𝐷′
1 𝑐𝐶
)    (81) 
Ellsberg’s results have been replicated many times, people strictly prefer Gamble 
A to B, and prefer Gamble D to C. The most of researchers believe that the 
experimental evidence suggests that people prefer risk to uncertainty. That is, 
according to decision structure that the result of (78), equivalent to (53), is A > B, and 
result of (80), equivalent to (46), is D > C. Therefore, the experimental evidence 
suggests that  
PB → 𝑎𝐵, PB < PA = 
1
3
 ; 
PC → 𝑏𝐶, PC < PD = 
2
3
 ; 
Pyellow → 𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 , Pyellow < PA = 
1
3
. 
Namely that, each probability of ball, draw a black ball (Gamble B) or draw a 
yellow ball (Gamble C), is an individual event. 
Thus,  
PB = p = 𝑎𝐵 
PC = q = 
1
3
 + 𝑎𝐶  ≠ 1- p  
From the above assumption, we can deduce two requisite laws of the decision 
group that 
a) A new probability will be substituted for an appropriate element of 
probability matrix, when we facing a risky situation. 
b) A new uncertainty probability will be substitute for a minimal element of 
probability matrix, when we facing an uncertainty situation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It is understandable that the better strategy is conservatively estimated the 
possibility of gain when we facing uncertainty from an evolutionary perspective. 
Actually, the Ellsberg paradox is not a real paradox, but a clue to understand what risk 
and uncertainty are. In the next step, we have to predict that the substitution, structure 
order reduction and calculation process might act on specific regions of the brain to 
regulate decision making. But the substitution and order reduction may not be 
separated out and directly observe with current technology. We have to discuss people 
makes decisions based on number or concept or both in the future research.  
Finally, life is complex and dynamic, we are almost certainly that the above 
assumption just discuss from a particular and simplest condition, which is a second 
order matrix. Along with the theory development, we have to reconsider what risky 
choice and decision structure are. We can deeply understand this complex process if 
all decision structures can be perfectly known. Our experience is far from being 
sufficient to enable us to accurately explanation what the decision making is. But, we 
wish to provide a different with the former method. 
In course of time, the mathematical consequences will be gradually deduced, and 
decision structure concepts, will be reconciled to the new ideas of decision making, in 
the prospect that they may lead to pre-established harmony between mathematics and 
decision making.  
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